游戏规则——中国“解放”西藏

China’s ‘Liberation’ of Tibet: Rules of the Game

游戏规则——中国“解放”西藏

Robert Barnett
罗伯特·巴内特

 

Xinhua
Audience members at the ceremony for ‘the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Tibet,’ Lhasa, July 19, 2011

新华社图片:西藏解放60周年庆典上的听众们(2011年7月19日)

Much of the talk about Vice President Joe Biden’s four-day visit to China last week centered on the man who hosted him: Xi Jinping, expected to become the country’s next president in 2012. Biden’s office has said that the principal purposes of his visit were “to build a relationship with Vice-President Xi” and “to get to know China’s future leadership.” But working out the thinking of China’s leaders has always been extremely difficult, and Xi is no exception.

关于上周美国副总统乔·拜登为期四天的中国之行的谈论,大多集中在接待他的习近平身上。习被认为是中国2012年中国权利更替后的下一任国家主席。拜登的办公室曾说他此次访问的基本目的是“与习副主席建立关系”和“了解一些中国未来的领导权情况”。但想了解中国领导人的想法通常是非常困难的,习也不例外。

Apart from an unusually rambunctious speech in 2009 when he lambasted foreigners and their “full bellies,” Xi’s political inclinations remain a black box. His public speeches have mostly consisted of boilerplate prose. In his most recent major speech, for example, delivered on July 19 in Lhasa, he began by saying that “the people of all ethnic groups in Tibet are chanting merrily to express their happiness and joy” and ended with a call to “fight against separatist activities by the Dalai clique.” The rest was mainly about China’s achievements in boosting the economy in Tibet—standard fare for Chinese leaders.

除了在2009年的一次讲话中习罕见粗暴的称外国人“吃饱了撑的”之外,习近平的政治倾向仍然是一个迷。他的公开讲话大多数都是照本宣科。在他近期的主要的讲话中,例如在6月19日在拉萨,他以“今天,古城拉萨花团锦簇,雪域高原焕然一新,各族人民纵情歌唱。”开篇,以号召“与达赖集团的分裂活动作斗争”结束。其他的大多是关于中国在发展西藏经济中取得的成绩——标准的中国领导人话语范式。

But the Lhasa speech was broadcast live on Chinese state television, an exceptional event and an indication of its national importance. Watching Xi deliver it gives a much more complex impression both of him and of China: the visual information largely conveys the opposite of Xi’s words.

但(习近平的)拉萨讲话在中国的国家电视台现场直播,这是很不寻常的事件,也显示出这个讲话的重要性。观看习的讲话使人对习本人和中国都留下了更复杂的印象:可见的信息传递了与习的讲话完全相反的情况。

The footage shows that Xi delivered his speech from a viewing platform erected in a vast new square in front of the Potala Palace, the Dalai Lama’s former residence in Lhasa. Banners above the stage show that the speech was part of the ceremonies marking what China calls “the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Tibet,” a reference to China’s assumption of sovereignty over Tibet in 1951 following its invasion a year earlier. There are frequent shots of the audience in the square, which included, according to the official Chinese media, “more than 20,000 Tibetans of all walks of life.”

镜头中,习近平在布达拉宫前面的一个新的巨大的广场上搭建起来的礼台上发表他的讲话,布达拉宫是达赖喇嘛原来在拉萨的住所。礼台上方的横幅显示习的讲话属于中国所称的“西藏解放六十周年庆典”的一部分,这是从1951年开始中国篡夺西藏的主权开始算起,而一年前的1950年,中国入侵西藏。镜头频频拍摄广场上的听众,根据中国官媒所称,“他们是超过两万名来自各行各业的藏人。”

But the footage does not support this claim. For one thing, only two monks are shown among the 20,000 people in the audience—one of them is shown repeatedly—suggesting that Tibetans from a “walk of life” that is integral to Tibetan society were not invited. As for women, there are many in the audience, but among the 200 or so senior Chinese and Tibetan officials who are shown seated on the viewing platform, all but five are men.

但镜头里的画面并不足以支撑这一说法。举个例子,在这所谓的两万人中,只有两个喇嘛——其中一个被不断出现在镜头里——显示作为整个西藏社会的组成部分的所谓的“各行各业”的藏人中,很多人并没有被邀请。而关于女性,坐在礼台上的近200名汉、藏高级官员中,只有5人是女性。

 

Another detail stands out too: No one in the audience has a chair.

另一个突出的细节:听众中没有一个人有椅子。

According to China Daily, Xi Jinping had brought with him 300,000 cold-proof stainless kettles, 710,000 stainless pressure cookers, 60,000 quilts, and 150 computers as gifts for the Tibetans. But, apparently, not chairs.

居中国日报的消息,习近平给西藏带来了30万件防冻茶壶、71万件不锈钢压力锅、6万条被子和150台计算机作为送给西藏的礼物,不过,显而易见的是,习近平忘了给西藏带来椅子。

The audience is seated on little plastic stools, about nine inches off the ground, arranged in straight rows in the vast new square, without a single broken line in either direction. They are arranged in blocks according to their profession or ethnicity, and thus to the color of their uniform or costume. One block of six hundred or so is green, which means it is the soldiers; another block is white, which is the doctors in their lab coats; a third block is light blue, which is the primary school children in their uniforms. The black block is that of junior officials wearing suits, most of whom seem to be Chinese, and the red block is Tibetan women from some area or group who have been assigned to wear Tibetan robes of the same color.

听众们坐在离地面9英寸高的塑料小板凳上,在巨大的新广场上排成竖排,从任何一个方向看都横直成列。他们被按照职业和民族编入不同的方阵,不同的方阵统一穿着不同颜色的制服或服装。有一个方阵大约有600人,穿绿色服装,都是军人。另一个方阵着白色服装的,全部都是医生。第三个方阵穿淡蓝色校服的,是小学生。穿黑色服装的方阵是着西装的普通公务员,大多数看起来是汉人。红色方阵的是被要求穿着同种颜色藏族长袍的来自各个地区和团体的藏族妇女。

 

Plastic stools arranged in front of the Potala Palace

布达拉宫前的塑料小板凳

I recall that when the stools were introduced for audiences at these mass rallies held to welcome state leaders in Tibet some ten years ago, they were seen as a sign of progress and a concession to the spectators, because presumably everyone had sat on the ground before. In the rural areas it remains like that, and official television news broadcasts in Tibet still show local leaders in county towns seated in chairs beneath lavish banners with slogans about development, lecturing Tibetans who are sitting silently in rows on the road.

我还能记起大概十年前当中国国家领导人访问西藏的时候,给参加那个大型集会的听众们提供小凳子的情形,那被看作是一种进步,和参加集会者的特权,因为在此之前这种场合听众们基本上只能坐在地上。在现在官方在西藏播出的电视节目里面,仍然可以见到地方官坐在豪华的宣扬“发展”的横幅下面讲话,而藏人听众们排成行静静的坐在地上听着。

The ceremony included speeches by three other Chinese leaders and one Tibetan, a local village chief, as well as a parade of marching students, militia and the military. It lasted for at least 147 minutes, according to the television footage, during which time everyone applauded on cue, at the end of each section of each speech. It must have been quite hot or tiring because some Tibetans in the square can be seen holding their heads in their hands and being comforted by other members of the audience. Occasionally one or two people get up and move, but for the most part, no one leaves his or her assigned spot. At the back of the crowd one can even see synchronized displays—words spelled out by rows of people holding up different characters that form huge slogans saying “We thank the Chinese People” and “Tibet’s Future Will be Better.” One could be forgiven at times for thinking that Lhasa had been taken over not by Beijing but by Pyongyang.

这场庆典还包括另外三名汉人领导的讲话、一名藏人的讲话,他是一名本地的村长,还有学生、民兵和军队的游行。根据电视镜头显示,庆典持续了最少147分钟,在其间,在每个人的演讲中,观众都在每一段的结尾处及时的鼓掌。现场应该很热或者观众们很累,因为可以看到广场上参加庆典的很多藏人都用手撑着头,周围的其他听众们在安慰他们。偶尔有人站起来活动,但大部分时候,没有人离开指定给他的位置。在人群的后方甚至可以看到(现场的)同步播出——演员们通过各种动作组合用人摆出“我们感谢中国人”“西藏明天更美好”的巨大标语。面对这种场景,要是有人觉得拉萨不是被北京当局接管,而是被平壤当局接管,那也是完全可以原谅的。

I was at the university in Lhasa in 2001, the last time an equally important Chinese official—Hu Jintao himself—spoke at such an event. He came to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the “liberation” and gave the same speech, almost word for word. I had seen it then on television, and the ceremony looked identical as well. In 2005 I was at Tibet University again during yet another ceremony (it was my last, because the cooperation program for our students from Columbia and other US universities was ended without explanation one year later) which that time marked the anniversary not of liberation but of Tibetans being given autonomy. Most of the Tibetans who were selected to be at that event were only told the night before that they were required to attend the ceremony the next day because of supposed security concerns. We foreigners were instructed not to leave the university until the event was over, and once we did, “not to look at anything we should not look at,” though we were not told what that was.

2001年我在拉萨的大学里,当时同等地位的中国官员——胡锦涛自己——在同样的庆典中讲话。当时他到西藏出席西藏“解放”50周年庆典,做了同样的讲话,几乎与今天习的讲话一字不差。当时我在电视上目睹了那一幕,庆典的内容也与今天几乎一样。2005年,我再次来到西藏大学,刚好遇到另一个庆典。(那是我最后一次西藏之行,因为哥伦比亚大学和其他美国大学(与西藏,译者注)的合作项目在一年后被终止,中方没有就此给出任何解释。)这个庆典的主题不是关于西藏“解放”,而是西藏获得“自治权”的庆典。被选中参加那次庆典的藏人们是在庆典的头天晚上才得到通知说,第二天将被要求参加庆典,之所以如此仓促的通知,是出于安全原因。我们这些外国人被要求在庆典结束之前不得离开大学校园,并且要求我们“不该看的不看”,但并不告诉我们哪些东西属于“不该看”的。

Those who were selected had to be in the square by about 5 AM, four hours or so before the ceremony started. Some of the rules of attendance during these events are known from a unique documentary called 16 Barkor Street South, made by the brilliant independent Chinese filmmaker Duan Jinchuan when the same ceremony was held in 1995 (again, to celebrate autonomy). In his film, an official is shown ordering the Tibetans who have been selected to go to the square not to drink too much beforehand because they will not be able to go to the toilet during the event. They are also ordered to wear Tibetan clothes. And they are told that if they wear clothes that have patches, it will be a “political offense,” which usually means a crime. And, at least as shown in the film, only Tibetans were required to attend, not local Chinese residents.

那些被选中的人必须在早上5点左右就到达庆典广场,比庆典开始早4个小时!人们对庆典中对参与者规定的了解,大多来自杰出的中国独立电影作者段锦川拍摄的记录片【八廓南街十六号】,记录的是1995年西藏的同一主题的庆典(再一次,关于“自治权”的庆典。)。在他的电影中,记录了一名官员命令那些被挑中到广场参加庆典的藏人,在去参加庆典之前不要喝得太醉了,因为庆典其间不允许上厕所。藏人们还被要求必须穿藏族服装,并且被告知“如果你们的衣服上有补丁,这属于“政治错误””,这在中国通常意味着犯罪。而且,从电影中看来,只有藏民被要求参加庆典,本地汉人并没有参加。

This year, the Tibetans in the square would again have been selected from their work units or residential committees and ordered to attend, and no one else would have been allowed to enter the square. This is at the heart of the interpretative problem surrounding the event: the crowd in the square was dwarfed by giant slogans saying “We thank you, CPC Central Committee.” How to explain that choice of slogan given that most Tibetans in the audience had been forced to be there? Wouldn’t most of them expect Party leaders to provide development and roads, and know that they are paid quite well to do so?

今年的庆典中出现在广场上的藏人,通常也是从他们各自的工作单位或者社区挑选出來被要求参加的,其他人一律不允许进入广场。这是对这个庆典最好的说明:广场上的人们被巨大的“我们感谢你,中共中央!”的标语矮化,那怎么解释广场上的大多数藏人是被迫出现在这里这一事实?莫非他们中的大多数不是期待党的领导能为他们发展经济和公路?并且知道这些领导们确实有义务这么做。

And why would Xi insist that “ethnic unity in Tibet has steadily enhanced” when the number of political protests and arrests in Tibetan areas has risen sharply in the last three years, or that “the religious beliefs of the people are fully respected and protected,” when all Tibetan students and Tibetan government employees in Tibet, including those in the audience, are forbidden from any Buddhist practices at all?

而且在过去三年来政治抗议和逮捕的事件在藏区大幅增加的情况下,习近平怎么能够说“各民族团结不断巩固”,和“群众的宗教信仰得到充分尊重和保护”,更何况这是在所有藏人学生和藏人公务员、包括在广场上参与庆典的这些人,都被禁止参加任何佛教活动的背景之下。

Some aspects of these events cannot be seen from the television footage alone; one has to be there on the ground. After the ceremony in 2005, we were all allowed out on the streets once the formal events had ended, and so I went to the Post Office, near the exit of the square, and joined a vast crowd of curious Tibetans to watch the participants as they left. But what we saw coming out of the square had not been visible on the television screen: hundreds of armed troops followed by armored personnel carriers, riot control vehicles, water-cannon trucks, barbed-wire laying machines, vehicles with gun turrets and other forms of military hardware.

庆典的一些方面无法在电视镜头中看到,除非你能够在现场观看。2005年时候,当正式的庆典结束,我们方可出门上街,于是我去了庆典广场出口附近的邮局,加入到了一大群好奇的围观藏人中,看着那些参加完庆典的人离开。但我们看到的这些场景在电视上是看不到的:数百名全副武装的军人、装甲车、防暴车、喷水车,还有安装铁丝网的机器、有炮塔的车辆和其他类型的军用装备。

The military vehicles and the troops were not visible in the footage of the ceremony this year either, but they were surely there again. Perhaps there is an underlying view that all Tibetans are rebels thirsting for a war. If so, it would explain why the head of China’s army had been sent to sit next to Xi Jinping on the stage during the ceremony. It would also explain why there were no chairs: presumably they are seen as potential weapons in the hands of imagined Tibetan rioters, more threatening than plastic stools.

在今年的庆典中,军队和军车在电视镜头中仍然看不到,但他们绝对在那里。可能有些观点认为藏人急不可待的等待着暴乱和战争。如果是这样的话,这就解释了为何中国军队的领导人在庆典中坐在习近平身边的的原因。这也解释了为何现场没有椅子:也许他们认为那些想象中的藏人叛乱者可以使用椅子作为武器,而这比塑料小板凳的杀伤力大。

Everyone can understand why China is proud of improving Tibetan infrastructure and wants to maintain its rule over Tibet, but it is not clear why its leaders, or even ordinary Chinese, expect forcing Tibetans to stage rituals of mass gratitude to Xi Jinping and the Chinese government not to fuel resentment. In any event, resentment seems to be spreading among Tibetans: last week on August 15 another Tibetan burnt himself to death, others say they have been tortured after staging minor protests, at least three of the 13 Tibetan areas in China remain closed to foreigners, and the state’s officially selected Panchen Lama cannot visit a monastery without a major security operation to prevent unrest.

所有人都能理解为何中国对西藏基础设施建设取得的成果的骄傲和想要继续维持在西藏的统治,但并不清楚为何中国领导人、甚至普通百姓期待强迫藏人表演“大大的感谢”习近平和中国政府就不会引起藏人的愤恨。在任何一个事件中,愤恨的情绪似乎都在藏人中蔓延:8月15号,另一名藏人自焚身亡;有人说他们在一场小型的抗议活动之后受到了酷刑;中国的13个藏区中至少三个仍然禁止外国人进入;官方选出的班禅在没有大量安保的情况下无法访问任何一所寺庙,因为担心引发骚乱。

How does Xi Jinping rationalize the practice of mass displays of forced gratitude, or the decision not to allow his Tibetan audience to sit on real chairs? Scholars talk of these rituals as a throwback to imperial traditions, as the legacy of Leninism, or as China’s way of dealing with the non-Chinese nationalities on its borders. But no one knows how leaders justify these practices to themselves. Joe Biden and the other US officials tasked with fathoming the logic of governance in China will not find the answer in their current visit. But at least they will get chairs.

习近平怎么合理地解释大规模的强迫藏人“感恩”的表演?或者不允许藏人听众们坐在一个真正的椅子上?学者们把此事看作一个帝国主义传统的重现、列宁主义的遗毒,或者有中国特色的对待边疆地区非汉族国民的方式。但没人能够知道中国领导人们自己怎么看待这个事情。拜登副总统和其他美国官员此次以了解中国政府统治逻辑的访问也没有找到答案,但至少,他们能得到个像样的椅子坐。

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